

New Dimensions to National Security

What is the issue?

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Geo-politics, strategic and technological developments adds uncertainties and new dimensions to national security.

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What are the recent trends?

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• Recent trends show greater likelihood of **sub-conventional**, hybrid and limited wars.

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- The nature of conflicts and the objectives of war are changing. $\space{1mm}\space{1m$
- New combat theatres, such as $\ensuremath{\textbf{cyber}}$ and $\ensuremath{\textbf{space}}$ are emerging. $\ensuremath{\sc vn}$
- The number of such conflicts has increased substantially in the last few years. \slash_n

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What is India's position?

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- India has over 4,900 km of long unresolved borders with two major neighbours, whom both are nuclear armed.
- Over the years, they have established a strong strategic alliance against India.

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- With China: In the last few years, China has extended its claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh.
- Already occupying Aksai Chin and Shaksgam part of Gilgit-Baltistan, it has shown no desire to resolve the boundary dispute, or even to delineate the line of actual control.
- The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), if and when it succeeds, would affect our relationship not only with Pakistan, but also with Central Asia, and even Afghanistan, which has remained neutral so far. \n
- With Pakistan: In dealing with Pakistan, we now have to consider China, the US, and even Russia. \n
- China has been equipping Pakistan with strategic and conventional military capabilities.

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- The US will continue to provide support to Pakistan, so long as it remains entangled in Afghanistan. \n
- The developing Russia-Pakistan military friendliness indicates that India can no longer take Russia for granted. \n

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What are the important non-traditional security challenges?

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- One the lack of strategic and security awareness of our ruling elite; $\slash n$
- Two partisan politics over national security issues which includes drawing the armed forces into political cross-fire; \n
- \bullet Our political leaders take little interest in long-term strategic and security issues other than rhetorical and emotional sound-bites. \n
- Three India's defence management. \slashn
- The requirement to re-organise the Ministry of Defence, its business rules and appointment of a CDS has been recommended by the Kargil Review Committee in 1999, the Group of Ministers in 2002, and the Naresh Chandra Committee in 2012.

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- It is essential to develop, prioritise and optimally employ inter-services capabilities and promote jointness in the armed forces. \n
- But vested interests and government unwillingness have successfully dodged this important national security challenge. \n
- Also, our **defence industrial base** will take 15-20 years to make up the armed forces' deficiencies with a reasonable level of modernisation. \n
- No country can stake claim to major power status unless it can design and produce a major proportion of the hardware required by its armed forces. \n

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What could be done?

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- On the internal security front, in recent years, cyber and space domains have added complexity. γ_n
- Any military cyber war infrastructure will have to **work in close** coordination with the National Information Board.
- And, we require frequent updating of weapons, equipment, revision of security concepts and doctrines, greater level of jointmanship and synergy, and much faster decision-making.
- We need more **aware and abled political leadership** to handle both the external and internal factors, with soft as well as hard power, and with as much consensus as possible.

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- Countering national security challenges and decision-making can no longer be dealt with in silos. γn
- These challenges require multi-disciplinary vertical and lateral consultations, and much faster decision-making. \n

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