In a recent speech, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that the “Quad” would ensure that “China retains only its proper place in the world”.
In this context, here is a look at China’s concerns about the “Quad.”
What is Quad?
“Quad” is a multilateral grouping among Japan, Australia, India and the United States.
Quad convened recently at the level of senior officials on the margins of the East Asia Summit in Bangkok.
Nuanced differences among the Quad countries seem to have narrowed down in the last 2 years.
There are common references to the creation of a free, open and inclusive regional architecture, rules-of-the-road, freedom of navigation and over-flight, and, ASEAN centrality.
What is China’s views on the Quad?
There is a general understanding that the Quad would not take on a military dimension against any country.
The strategic community in China, nevertheless, had branded it an emerging “Asian NATO”.
Notably, Japanese PM Shinzo Abe’s “Confluence of Two Seas” address to the Indian Parliament gave a fresh impetus to the Quad concept.
He had recently spoken of a new definition of a “broader Asia” taking shape at the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
This recognised the economic rise of India.
It also brought Japan and India together as part of an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, the US and Australia.
It was seen as an open and transparent network that would allow people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely.
What are China’s key concerns?
Beginning with maritime-centric concerns, Quad was gradually seen by China as a means to an end.
China sees Quad as involving the use of the wider Indo-Pacific theatre to target China.
It believes that the concept of the Indo-Pacific, and more particularly the Quad, is a plot by the US aimed at containing China’s rise.
It is particularly seen as opposing the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), questioning its developmental finance and connectivity projects.
Quad is seen as the foundation for a military alliance to undermine China’s future.
China, notably, remains wedded to “Asia-Pacific” for building an inclusive regional cooperative structure.
So, for China, a switch to “Indo-Pacific” implies an erosion of its pre-eminence.
In this backdrop, China sees ASEAN centrality as an opportunity to steer the Indo-Pacific away from a security agenda focused on China.
What are China’s plans in this regard?
Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent remarks to foreign and Chinese journalists gains importance in the above context.
His five-point formula entailed -
making greater efforts to work together on the BRI
forging China-ASEAN digital cooperation, including in 5G
fully implementing the China-ASEAN FTA
finalising regional rules-of-the-road based on the negotiating text of the Code of Conduct (proposed by China)
engaging in joint maritime exercises (already undertaken between China and ASEAN in October 2018)
China has also signed bilateral agreements with ASEAN countries to advance transportation routes.
These include the existing economic corridors, China-Thailand Railway, China-Laos Railway and Jakarta-Bandung high-speed Railway.
Where does India stand in this?
India’s commitment to “strategic autonomy” has generally proved reassuring to China.
It suggests that India would never agree to fully align itself with the US against China.
The recent Mamallapuram summit between President Xi Jinping and PM Modi is a positive development.
China is, however, worried about the advantages that the Quad process might offer to India in the Indo-Pacific.
Much, though, will depend on China’s actions and how others perceive her capabilities and intentions.
